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I. Introduction 
Enforcing intellectual property rights through the 
administration of the Domain Name System (DNS)—the Internet’s 
addressing system—is not a revolutionary development. 
Trademark rights have been enforced to a limited extent within 
the DNS since 1999, when the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN)—the specially-created entity that 
oversees governance and administration of the DNS—introduced 
the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) for 
adjudicating fights over domain names containing trademarked 
words and phrases.1  
Copyright enforcement, by contrast, has never been ICANN’s 
bailiwick; nor has it been the province of DNS registries or 
registrars—the intermediaries that operate the DNS on a 
day-to-day basis under contract with ICANN.2 ICANN has 
historically recognized that its role as an online intellectual 
property enforcer stops at trademarks in domain names and does 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Timeline for the Formulation and Implementation of the Uniform 
Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/ 
resources/pages/schedule-2012-02-25-en (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) [hereinafter 
Timeline] (providing links to historical documents relating to the formulation, 
approval, and implementation of the UDRP) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 2. These intermediaries include ICANN-approved registry operators (or 
registries) and registrars. For each Top Level Domain (TLD), there is one registry 
operator responsible for the master database of all domain names in that “zone” 
and for the operation of that TLD’s authoritative name servers, which look up 
location information in response to user queries. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
SIGNPOSTS IN CYBERSPACE: THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM AND INTERNET NAVIGATION 
125–26 (2005) [hereinafter SIGNPOSTS] (“ICANN has been delegated authority by 
the [Department of Commerce (DOC)] (and subject to DOC’s approval) over 
entries in the root zone and, consequently, it can determine which organization is 
delegated responsibility for each ccTLD and gTLD.”). Registries contract with 
various registrars to sell and register domain names to members of the public. 
See id. at 136–38 (explaining the relationship between registries, registrars, and 
registrants). 
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not extend to copyrights in online content.3 Its public messaging 
on this point is quite clear.4  
In recent years, however, ICANN has faced increasing 
pressure from corporate copyright holders, who believe that all 
online intermediaries, including those that operate the DNS, 
should be responsible for enforcing copyrights.5 Although ICANN 
has continued to resist direct involvement in copyright 
enforcement activities, it accommodated right holders in 2013 by 
altering its contracts with DNS intermediaries to support a system 
of extra-judicial, notice-driven sanctions. That system includes 
cancellation of domain names for “pirate sites” about which right 
holders complain.6 Through these contractual modifications, 
ICANN has abetted the development and implementation of a 
potentially large-scale program of privately-ordered online content 
regulation in the Internet’s new generic Top Level Domains (new 
gTLDs).7  
                                                                                                     
 3. See, e.g., About Copyright Infringement, ICANN, 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/copyright-2013-05-03-en (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2017) (“Complaints regarding copyright infringement due to Internet 
and website content are outside of ICANN’s scope and authority.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See, e.g., MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AM., INC., COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO 
THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE FOR PUBLIC 
COMMENTS: VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES STUDY 72 (Aug. 21, 2013), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170706040417/https://www.uspto.gov/ip/officechie
fecon/PTO-C-2013-0036.pdf (arguing that “all players in the Internet ecosystem,” 
including “the various intermediaries that facilitate online commerce and 
speech . . . must play a meaningful role in addressing the problem of rampant 
piracy on the Web”); see also RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., INC.,  COMMENTS IN 
RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 
FOR PUBLIC COMMENTS: VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES STUDY 15 (Aug. 19, 2013), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170706040417/https://www.uspto.gov/ip/officechie
fecon/PTO-C-2013-0036.pdf (asserting that “all responsible stakeholders in the 
Internet ecosystem . . . have a role to play in . . . deterring illegal activity”). 
 6. See infra Part IV.B (explaining how ICANN’s standard contracts provide 
the supporting legal infrastructure for the system). 
 7. “The early DNS included eight generic top-level domains (gTLDs): .edu 
(institutions of higher education—most of which were based in the United States), 
.gov (U.S. government), .mil (U.S. military), .com (commerce), .net (network 
resources), .org (other organizations and persons), .int (international treaty 
organizations), and .arpa (network infrastructure).” SIGNPOSTS, supra note 2, at 
45. These are generally referred to as the “legacy gTLDs” to distinguish them from 
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This Article maps ICANN’s ambivalent drift into online 
content regulation through its contractual facilitation of a “trusted 
notifier” copyright enforcement program between the Motion 
Picture Association of America (MPAA) and two registry operators 
for new gTLDs, Seattle-based Donuts and Abu Dhabi-based 
Radix.8 For domain name registrants, who are the target of this 
new—and wholly unregulated—enforcement program, and for 
members of the public who worry about increasing online 
censorship, the development is cause for concern.  
After discussing ICANN’s history, mission, and circumscribed 
role in the resolution of disputes over trademarks in domain 
names, this Article reckons both descriptively and normatively 
with the fact that registry operators are now acting—without 
precedent but with ICANN’s blessing—as private copyright 
enforcers on behalf of right holders.9 My focus here is a program 
that is currently limited to alleged copyright violations; the 
program is designed, however, to flexibly address a wide range of 
activity that a wide range of notifiers might consider illegal or 
abusive.10 Copyright may simply be the first-use case for what is 
                                                                                                     
“new gTLDs.” Since 2013, ICANN has greatly expanded the gTLD name space to 
include more than 1,000 “new gTLDs.” See Akram Atallah, A “Grand” Milestone: 
New gTLD Program Reaches 1,000th Delegation, ICANN (May 25, 2016), 
https://www.icann.org/news/blog/a-grand-milestone-new-gtld-program-reaches-
1-000th-delegation (last visited Sept. 10, 2017) (“There are nearly 50 times as 
many gTLDs as there were in 2013 when the first four applications completed the 
New gTLD Program.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. See PRESS RELEASE, MPAA, DONUTS & THE MPAA ESTABLISH NEW P’SHIP 
TO REDUCE ONLINE PIRACY 1 (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.mpaa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Donuts-and-MPAA-Establish-New-Partnership-2.9.16. 
pdf (“Under the terms of the agreement, the MPAA will be treated as a ‘Trusted 
Notifier’ for the purpose of reporting large-scale pirate websites that are 
registered in a domain extension operated by Donuts.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Dean Marks, MPAA/Radix 
Partnership Highlights Momentum Behind Voluntary Initiatives, MPAA BLOG 
(May 13, 2016), http://www.mpaa.org/new-mpaaradix-partnership-highlights-
the-continuing-momentum-of-voluntary-initiatives/#.V8cQ4TV76Hw (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2017) (“Similar to the partnership with Donuts announced in February, 
the MPAA will be treated as a ‘trusted notifier’ under this agreement.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 9. See infra Parts IV–V (explaining ICANN’s historical and evolving role in 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights through the DNS). 
 10. See infra Part IV.C (describing the program’s broad conceptions of 
“trusted notifier” and “abusive behavior”). 
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intended to become a broad program of notice-driven, 
registry-brokered domain takedowns. 
II. ICANN 101 
ICANN was formed as a private-sector, non-profit corporation 
in 1998 to manage the newly-invented DNS under contract with 
the U.S. Department of Commerce.11 The organization has grown 
in size and structural complexity over time, but its raison d’être 
remains performance of the Internet’s IANA (Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority) functions.12 These are, as ICANN describes 
them, “key technical services critical to the continued operations of 
the Internet’s underlying address book, the Domain Name System 
(DNS).”13 Stated succinctly, ICANN is responsible for ensuring 
that the DNS, as technical infrastructure, works stably and 
securely so that users’ web page queries and email messages are 
routed to the correct servers.14 ICANN’s mandate is technical and 
administrative; it has not historically included enforcement of 
national or international law governing the content that is 
disseminated over the Internet.15 
In 2016, in recognition of the increasingly international 
character and reach of the Internet, ICANN became a fully 
independent entity accountable only to its community of volunteer 
stakeholders.16 The corporation is headed by a board of directors, 
                                                                                                     
 11. See SIGNPOSTS, supra note 2, at 77 (describing the founding of ICANN). 
 12. See Welcome to ICANN!, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/ 
welcome-2012-02-25-en (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“[T]he Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) helps coordinate the Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions . . . .”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. (describing the IANA functions in more detail). 
 15. See What Does ICANN Do?, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/ 
resources/pages/what-2012-02-25-en (last visited Sept. 19, 2017) (“ICANN doesn’t 
control content on the Internet . . . . ICANN’s role is to oversee the huge and 
complex interconnected network of unique identifiers that allow computers on the 
Internet to find one another.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 16. Republican legislators failed in an eleventh-hour attempt to block the 
so-called IANA transition, and the DOC allowed its contract with ICANN to 
expire, according to plan, on September 30. See Paul Blake, US Government 
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which has sixteen voting members and five non-voting liaison 
representatives.17 Having relinquished its historical role as 
ICANN’s overseer, the United States is now a coequal member of 
ICANN’s multilateral Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), 
which represents the interests of national governments and a 
limited range of other entities.18 The GAC is just one of many 
stakeholder groups that advise ICANN’s board on matters of 
policy, but it is now substantially more influential than it was in 
ICANN’s early days.19  
ICANN’s bureaucracy is notoriously byzantine, consisting of 
scores of advisory committees, supporting organizations, standing 
committees, working groups, review teams, and task forces.20 All 
of these are known by acronyms that are a part of an 
ICANN-specific vernacular that insiders speak fluently.21 For the 
uninitiated, understanding conversations about ICANN’s 
                                                                                                     
Hands Internet’s ‘Address Book’ to International Organization, ABC NEWS (Oct. 
1, 2016, 7:21 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/us-government-hands-
internets-address-book-international-organization/story?id=42474458 (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2017) (“Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, was so alarmed by the transition 
that he attempted to have it blocked through a spending bill that was passed this 
week to keep the government funded beyond Friday.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 17. ICANN, BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO PARTICIPATING IN ICANN 5 (2013) 
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/participating-08nov13-en.pdf 
[hereinafter BEGINNER’S GUIDE]. 
 18. See id. at 11 (“The GAC’s key role is to provide advice to ICANN on issues 
of public policy, especially where there may be an interaction between ICANN’s 
activities or policies and national laws or international agreements.”).  
 19. See Jonathan Weinberg, Governments, Privatization, and 
“Privatization”: ICANN and the GAC, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 189, 216 
(2011) (describing the GAC’s increasingly aggressive role in ICANN policy 
making on behalf of the U.S. and European governments and “their most 
influential business lobbies”); see also A. Michael Froomkin, Almost Free: An 
Analysis of ICANN’s ‘Affirmation of Commitments,’ 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 187, 195–96 (2011) [hereinafter Froomkin, Almost Free] (discussing 
causes and effects of 2002 changes to ICANN’s bylaws that gave the GAC more 
power within ICANN’s governance process).  
 20. See Groups, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/groups-
2012-02-06-en (last visited Sept. 19, 2017) (listing the various entities which 
collectively form ICANN) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 21. For a detailed discussion of ICANN’s highly complex structure and 
governance, see Emily M. Weitzenboeck, Hybrid Net: The Regulatory Framework 
of ICANN and the DNS, 22 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 49, 50 (2014). 
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structure and internal operations almost literally requires a 
translator. Put another way, informational barriers to entry in the 
ICANN universe are relatively high, and ICANN is consequently 
poorly understood by anyone whose curiosity about it is only casual 
or shallow.22 
ICANN describes itself as an organization that makes policy 
for the DNS through a bottom-up, consensus-based, community 
governance process open to participation by anyone with time and 
inclination to volunteer.23 In theory, ICANN’s multi-stakeholder 
governance model is non-hierarchical and highly pluralistic.24 As 
a practical matter, well-funded and organized interest groups, 
including trade associations representing corporate intellectual 
property right holders, have resources and capacity to participate 
that most individuals and public interest groups lack.25 ICANN 
holds week-long meetings three times a year in different 
geographic regions, which means that in-person participation 
requires not only time and inclination, but also a significant 
financial investment in international travel.26 Moreover, 
                                                                                                     
 22. See CECILIA TESTART, UNDERSTANDING ICANN’S COMPLEXITY IN A 





001&EXT=pdf (attributing the organization’s opacity in part to the constant, 
voluminous flow of information and reports produced by its constituent groups 
and the poor organization of that information on ICANN’s website). 
 23. See BEGINNER’S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 2 (“This decentralized 
governance model places individuals, industry, non-commercial interests and 
government on an equal level. Unlike more traditional, top-down governance 
models, where governments make policy decisions, the multistakeholder 
approach used by ICANN allows for community-based consensus-driven 
policy-making.”). 
 24. See id. (stating that the goal of ICANN’s governance model is to “mimic 
the structure of the Internet itself—borderless and open to all”). 
 25. See LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 16 
(2014) (“The question is not whose voices are allowed to participate but whose 
voices are able to participate. Technocracy and democracy often diverge, even 
when governance processes embody values of openness and inclusion.”). 
 26. See BEGINNER’S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 3 (“Meetings are open to 
everyone and registration is free, but you are responsible for your own travel and 
lodging.”). 
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commercial actors like the MPAA and the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA), which belong to ICANN’s 
Intellectual Property Constituency (IPC), are savvy lobbyists who 
know how to work the internal politics of governance to amplify 
their voices and draw the focus of leadership—including the 
increasingly influential GAC—to their concerns.27 That is, after 
all, their job. The less sophisticated and economically powerful 
stakeholders within ICANN enjoy comparatively less access and 
influence.28 
Given the size of the Internet, and the increasing size of its 
domain name space, coordinating the end-to-end operation of the 
DNS is no small task.29 Beginning in 2013, ICANN created over 
1,200 new gTLDs in the DNS.30 The number of domain names that 
can be registered in these new gTLDs is vast. The importance of 
the IANA functions to the navigational security, speed, and 
reliability that users have come to expect of the Internet is difficult 
to overstate.31 Even as online traffic becomes less browser- and 
email-centric, ICANN continues to exercise significant power 
                                                                                                     
 27. Cf. Weinberg, supra note 19, at 209 (discussing the rise of the GAC as a 
strong force within ICANN for making “broad arguments reflecting the views of 
private lobbies on a wide range of matters,” including intellectual property 
protection).   
 28. See id. at 217 (“It has always been the case at ICANN that pressure by 
those with influence and power gets results.”).  
 29. As a reference point, in 2016 there were over 130.6 million registered 
domain names in .com alone, though it is by far the largest of the gTLDs. See .com 
Monthly Registry Reports, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/ pages/com-
2014-03-04-en (last visited Sept. 19, 2017) (listing total domains registered in 
.com for the reporting period) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
see also Usage of Top Level Domains for Websites, W3TECHS, 
https://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/top_level_domain/all (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2017) (reporting that 47% of all websites have .com domain names) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 30. See Program Statistics, ICANN, https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/program-
status/statistics (last visited Sept. 19, 2017) (providing an overview of and 
statistics for the new gTLD program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); see also Atallah, supra note 7 (discussing the growth of the gTLD name 
space over time). 
 31. See SIGNPOSTS, supra note 2, at 18 (“The preservation of a stable, reliable, 
and effective Domain Name System [is] crucial both to effective Internet 
navigation and to the operation of the Internet and most of the applications that 
it supports.”). 
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through its stewardship of the IANA functions. It controls which 
domains on the web are visible—or invisible, as some would like—
to Internet users all over the world.32 
III. Trademarks, Cybersquatting, and the UDRP 
ICANN was not created or intended to be an intellectual 
property enforcer but was drawn from its inception into disputes 
over trademark rights in domain names.33 As the Internet’s 
commercial potential became clear in the mid-1990s, and 
established brick-and-mortar businesses began to appreciate the 
need for an online presence, some of the country’s most famous 
corporations found themselves tangling with a new breed of 
entrepreneur. So-called cybersquatters were named for their 
practice of preemptively registering domain names containing 
famous trademarks and then offering to transfer the registrations 
to later-arriving trademark holders for exorbitant prices.34 Dennis 
Toeppen, one of the early Internet’s more prolific cybersquatters, 
registered over a hundred domain names containing famous 
trademarks for a range of businesses, including airlines (Delta, 
Lufthansa) and clothing retailers (Eddie Bauer, Neiman 
Marcus).35 Cybersquatting was among the Internet’s first cottage 
industries, and trademark holders did not like it.36 
                                                                                                     
 32. See Froomkin, Almost Free, supra note 19, at 211 (“ICANN can make 
visible and usable—or nearly invisible and largely useless—TLDs such as .com or 
.ibm.”).  
 33. See Timeline, supra note 1 (describing the early formation of a dispute 
resolution process for domain names containing trademarked words and phrases) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 34. See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2001) (defining 
cybersquatting as “the bad faith, abusive registration and use of the distinctive 
trademarks of others as Internet domain names, with the intent to profit from the 
goodwill associated with those trademarks”). 
 35. See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“Toeppen has registered domain names for various other companies including 
Delta Airlines, Neiman Marcus, Eddie Bauer, Lufthansa, and over 100 other 
marks. Toeppen has attempted to ‘sell’ domain names for other trademarks such 
as intermatic.com to Intermatic, Inc. for $10,000 and americanstandard.com to 
American Standard, Inc. for $15,000.”). 
 36. See id. at 1317 (“Panavision accuses Dennis Toeppen of being a ‘cyber 
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At the time, the practice was not obviously illegal, and courts 
across the country were struggling to apply brick-and-mortar 
trademark law in the uncharted territory of “cyberspace.”37 Their 
task was not an easy one because, as Michael Froomkin pointed 
out at the time, “[t]rademark law is organized around a set of 
objectives and assumptions that map badly onto the Internet.”38 
Trademark rights in real space are linked to specific categories of 
goods and specific geography, meaning that businesses selling 
different types of goods in the same physical location—or the same 
type of goods in different physical locations—can legitimately use 
the same mark or similar marks.39 The domain name space, by 
contrast, imposes scarcity inasmuch as a domain name in any 
given Top Level Domain (TLD) can be controlled by only one 
person.40 So, while there can be multiple legitimate users of a 
trademark, there can be only one registrant for the corresponding 
domain name in any given TLD.41 The potential for good faith legal 
conflicts arising from this technical limitation is obvious.  
Cybersquatting, however, did not involve competing claims to 
a domain name by existing terrestrial businesses legitimately 
selling goods under the same trademark or similar trademarks.42 
To many, the practice looked opportunistic at best and extortionate 
at worst.43 Powerful trademark holders were incensed at the 
                                                                                                     
pirate’ . . . .”). 
 37. See Jennifer Golinveaux, What’s in a Domain Name: Is “Cybersquatting” 
Trademark Dilution?, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 641, 671 (1999) (critiquing courts’ 
application of the trademark dilution doctrine in cybersquatting). 
 38. A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy”—
Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 608 (2002) [hereinafter 
Froomkin, Causes and (Partial) Cures]. 
 39. See id. at 614 (explaining that “the guiding principle behind much of 
trademark law is that it best achieves its purposes by limiting the reservation of 
rights in a name to the type of goods and location where those goods are sold”). 
 40. See id. at 615 (“In contrast to trademark law’s ability to tolerate multiple 
users of the same mark, the Internet enforces a greater degree of uniqueness.”). 
 41. One impetus for adding new gTLDs to the domain name space was to 
eliminate this scarcity. TLDs could be geo-partitioned to solve the scarcity 
problem, but that would undermine the unitary and global nature of the DNS. 
 42. See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 479–80 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining 
the practice of a cybersquatter who registered five domain names that were 
similar to the plaintiff’s legitimate domain name). 
 43. See id. at 487 (describing one cybersquatter’s conduct as “egregious”). 
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prospect of having to ransom domain names containing their 
marks from third parties whose sole motive for registration was 
resale of the domain name for profit.44 Right holders persuaded 
policy makers, at least with respect to the practice of 
cybersquatting, that the right to control the use of a trademark in 
real space should translate into a right to control the use of a 
domain name containing that trademark. In 1999, Congress 
amended the Lanham Act to include the Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), creating a cause of action in 
federal courts for bad-faith registration of a domain name 
containing a protected trademark.45 
ICANN almost simultaneously adopted the UDRP, driven by 
recommendations from a World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) study initiated at the request of the Department of 
Commerce in response to complaints by trademark holders about 
perceived violations of their rights within the DNS.46 
Commentators at the time were split over whether the program 
was a good idea. Critics raised concerns about the lack of 
procedural fairness for registrants, the potential for reverse 
domain name hijacking by overreaching trademark holders, and 
the danger of arbitral bias linked to complainants’ ability to forum 
shop among accredited arbitrators.47 Trademark holders were also 
                                                                                                     
 44. See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“Panavision alleged that Toeppen was in the business of stealing trademarks, 
registering them as domain names on the Internet and then selling the domain 
names to the rightful trademark owners.”). 
 45. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012)  
A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark . . . if, 
without regard to the goods or services of the parties, that 
person . . . has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark . . . and 
registers . . . a domain name that . . . is identical or confusingly similar 
to that mark . . . . 
 46. See Froomkin, Causes and (Partial) Cures, supra note 38, at 612, 623 
(showing WIPO’s recommendations, which  later became the basis for  the UDRP); 
see also A. Michael Froomkin, Semi-Private International Rulemaking: Lessons 
Learned from the WIPO Domain Name Process, in REGULATING THE GLOBAL 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 211, 212 (Christopher T. Marsden ed., 2000) (describing the 
“semi-private rulemaking” ICANN developed through input from WIPO). At the 
time, it was not clear what rights trademark holders had in the DNS, but they 
proceeded from the assumption that their territorial entitlements could and 
should translate straightforwardly into virtual ones. 
 47. See Froomkin, Causes and (Partial) Cures, supra note 38, at 688–710 
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unhappy, believing that the scope of the program was too narrow 
because it defined cybersquatting to require both bad faith 
registration and use, and because it excluded both claims for 
infringement beyond cybersquatting and claims for dilution.48 
From a doctrinal perspective, the UDRP effectively globalized 
what had previously been only national trademark rights by 
importing them into the boundary-agnostic DNS.49 It was, in that 
sense, a major win for big-brand trademark holders. 
The UDRP is an ICANN-administered alternative dispute 
resolution system in which ICANN-accredited arbitrators decide 
disputes via a streamlined, web-enabled process.50 It is mandatory 
for all registrars and registrants in all gTLDs.51 The UDRP was 
specifically designed to be ICANN’s efficient, low-cost answer to 
cybersquatting, defined as “registration and use in bad faith” of a 
domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to a 
trademark.52 Trademark cases that do not involve cybersquatting 
cannot be adjudicated via the UDRP—meaning, for example, that 
trademark claims against website operators who are alleged to sell 
                                                                                                     
(discussing and suggesting solutions to a range of problems related to fairness). 
 48. Id. at 611. Froomkin collects citations to journal articles from the period 
that establish positions for and against the UDRP. See id. at 609 n.9, 610 n.10 
(providing sources arguing from both sides of the UDRP debate). 
 49. See id. (observing that the UDRP effectively internationalized 
trademark law). 
 50. See Domain Name Dispute Resolution Service for Generic Top-Level 
Domains, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/gtld/ (last visited Sept. 19, 
2017) (“In December 1999, the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center began 
offering domain name dispute resolution services under the Uniform Domain 
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 51. See Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, ICANN, 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/help/dndr/udrp-en (last visited Sept. 19, 
2017) (“All registrars must follow the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution 
Policy . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The UDRP is not 
mandatory for managers of country code TLDs (ccTLDs), which are not 
administered by ICANN. See FAQs, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/ 
pages/faqs-2014-01-21-en (last visited Sept. 19, 2017) (“ICANN does not accredit 
registrars or set registration policies for ccTLDs.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 52. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN, 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2012-02-25-en (last visited Sept. 
20, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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counterfeit branded goods (e.g., NFL jerseys or COACH handbags) 
are beyond its scope.53 The UDRP’s remedial scope is also narrow; 
its only available remedy is cancellation or transfer of the disputed 
domain name from the registrant to the complainant.54  
Once a UDRP complaint is filed by a complainant (who can 
choose from a list of ICANN-approved providers), a registrant 
must participate in the UDRP process until its conclusion.55 If 
either party to a UDRP proceeding is dissatisfied with the result, 
that party can file a claim contesting the result in a court of 
competent jurisdiction.56 A losing registrant has only ten business 
days to file a claim in court and produce evidence that she has done 
so to the registrar.57 If the registrant timely files a lawsuit, the 
prevailing complainant’s remedy is stayed pending the outcome of 
the litigation.58 If the losing registrant fails to file within the 
ten-day window, the domain name is cancelled or transferred.59 
UDRP outcomes have historically skewed heavily in favor of 
complainants. WIPO reports that for all years the UDRP has been 
active, 86% of disputes have resulted in the transfer of the domain 
name to the complainant.60 Registrants have prevailed in only 12% 
                                                                                                     
 53. See id. (explaining in section five that “[a]ll other disputes . . . that are 
not brought pursuant to the mandatory administrative proceeding provisions 
of Paragraph 4 shall be resolved between you and such other party through any 
court, arbitration or other proceeding”).  
 54. See id. (listing in section four that “[t]he remedies available to a 
complainant pursuant to any proceeding before an Administrative Panel shall be 
limited to requiring the cancellation of your domain name or the transfer of your 
domain name registration to the complainant”). 
 55. See id. (“The complainant shall select the Provider from among those 
approved by ICANN by submitting the complaint to that Provider. The selected 
Provider will administer the proceeding, except in cases of consolidation as 
described in Paragraph 4(f).”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. (“[W]e will not implement the Administrative Panel’s 
decision . . . until we receive . . . evidence satisfactory to us of a 
resolution; . . . evidence satisfactory to us that your lawsuit has been dismissed 
or withdrawn; or . . . a copy of an order from such court . . . .”). 
 59. See id. (“We will then implement the decision unless we have received 
from you during that ten (10) business day period official documentation . . . .”). 
 60. Case Outcome (Consolidated): All Years, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statistics/decision_rate.jsp?year= (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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of cases.61 Critics of the process point to these numbers and to the 
fact that a small number of providers handle the vast majority of 
UDRP complaints as evidence that the system has created strong 
structural incentives for providers to rule in favor of 
complainants.62 A provider whose results do not demonstrably 
favor complainants can easily find itself without any customers—
as happened to eResolution, an accredited provider that went out 
of business in the early years of the UDRP for lack of a sustainable 
case load.63  
The results of UDRP cases are undeniably wildly lopsided, but 
it is difficult to determine the extent to which pro-complainant bias 
is the cause. Empirical study of the quality of UDRP 
decision-making is hampered by the fact that opinions alone are 
published without any of the parties’ submissions.64 Lack of access 
to a full, public record makes it impossible to evaluate the 
provider’s reasoning in light of the facts and competing arguments 
presented to it.65 This lack of transparency—a longstanding 
general criticism of ICANN’s culture—forecloses an important 
element of due process, namely the ability to interrogate and 
critique legal outcomes through examination of the inputs that 
informed them. 
The UDRP became the anti-cybersquatting law of the global 
Internet because ICANN made it so, under significant pressure 
from trademark holders, through non-negotiable contractual 
provisions that flow down from ICANN to registries, then 
registrars, and ultimately registrants.66 ICANN conditions the 
                                                                                                     
 61. Id.  
 62. See Orna Rabinovich-Einy, The Legitimacy Crisis and the Future of 
Courts, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 23, 54 (2015) (summarizing criticisms of 
the UDRP). 
 63. See Froomkin, Causes and (Partial) Cures, supra note 38, at 718 
(“Between the original submission of this Article and its going to press, 
eResolution folded, cited shrinking market share due to the complainants’ bar’s 
preference for providers they thought would enhance their chances of winning.”). 
 64. Id. at 709. 
 65. See id. (“Not only does this make independent judgments difficult, but it 
makes any review by ICANN unlikely to be meaningful.”).  
 66. See Froomkin, Almost Free, supra note 19, at 214 (“By requiring the 
registries—as a condition of being listed in the root—to require the registrars to 
include standard form terms in their contracts with registrants, ICANN gains a 
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accreditation of registrars on their agreement to require 
registrants to submit to the UDRP if a trademark holder disputes 
a registration on cybersquatting grounds.67 Within this privately 
ordered legal framework, a registrant cannot register a domain 
name and have it entered into the authoritative zone file for the 
TLD to which it belongs unless the registrant agrees to submit to 
the UDRP.68 In this way, trademark holders are indirect 
beneficiaries of ICANN’s agreements with DNS intermediaries.  
IV. Notice and Takedown in the New gTLDs 
Starting with the launch of the new gTLDs, copyright holders 
appear to be laying the groundwork for a broad program of 
DNS-based enforcement, with the long-term goal of implementing 
a UDRP-like procedure for claims of piracy and counterfeiting that 
are wholly unrelated to any bad-faith or confusing use of domain 
names.69 The idea of a UDRP for online copyright disputes has 
                                                                                                     
degree of control over registrants . . . .”). The UDRP is not mandatory, however, 
for registrants of domain names in country code Top Level Domains (ccTLDs) 
(e.g., .ca, .fr, .nz). See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, supra 
note 52 (stating that only some ccTLDs participate in the UDRP program). 
 67. See ICANN, REGISTRAR ACCREDITATION AGREEMENT § 3.8 (2013), 
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/approved-with-specs-27jun13-en.pdf 
[hereinafter REGISTRAR ACCREDITATION AGREEMENT] (“During the Term of this 
Agreement, Registrar shall have in place a policy and procedures for resolution of 
disputes concerning Registered Names.”). With the introduction of the new 
gTLDs, ICANN introduced an additional procedure for adjudicating 
cybersquatting complaints, the Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS) program. See 
ICANN, UNIFORM RAPID SUSPENSION § 1.2.6.1 (2013), http://newgtlds.icann.org/ 
en/applicants/urs/procedure-01mar13-en.pdf [hereinafter URS] (“The Form 
Complaint shall include space for . . . [a]n indication of the grounds upon which 
the Complaint is based . . . , namely: . . . that the registered domain name is 
identical or confusing similar to a word mark . . . .”). A discussion of the URS is 
beyond the scope of this project. Participation in both the UDRP and the URS 
procedure is required under the 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement. 
REGISTRAR ACCREDITATION AGREEMENT, supra, § 3.8. 
 68. See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, supra note 52 
(“This Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the ‘Policy’) . . . is 
incorporated by reference into your Registration Agreement . . . .”).  
 69. See MEETING TRANSCRIPT, MARRAKECH—INDUSTRY BEST PRACTICES—
THE DNA’S HEALTHY DOMAINS INITIATIVE 12–13 (Mar. 6, 2016), 
https://meetings.icann.org/en/marrakech55/schedule/wed-dna-healthy-domains-
initiative/transcript-dna-healthy-domains-initiative-09mar16-en.pdf 
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been floating around in law reviews and journals for a long time, 
but it has never really gotten much traction.70 With buy-in from 
new gTLD registry operators like Donuts and Radix, however, that 
status quo shows signs of changing.71  
For its part, ICANN is walking the finest of lines with respect 
to involvement in copyright policing. As I explain below in Part B, 
ICANN created the legal infrastructure for the MPAA’s trusted 
notifier program through specific provisions in its contracts with 
new gTLD intermediaries.72 At the same time, however, it 
continues to insist that it is not in the business of online content 
regulation.73 ICANN’s apparent ambivalence on this point grows 
                                                                                                     
[hereinafter MEETING TRANSCRIPT] (“We’re discussing and exploring the idea that 
there could be a clearinghouse that can include copyright, piracy, and 
counterfeiting, along with other potential online abusive behavior, and then 
perhaps developing a new dispute resolution model similar to UDRP.”).  
 70. See, e.g., Steven Tremblay, The Stop Online Piracy Act: The Latest 
Manifestation of a Conflict Ripe for Alternative Dispute Resolution, 15 CARDOZO 
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 819, 820 (2014) (“Alternative dispute 
resolution . . . mechanisms provide a viable alternative to the costly and often 
counterproductive international efforts to curb online piracy.”); see also Mark A. 
Lemley & Anthony R. Reese, A Quick and Inexpensive System for Resolving 
Peer-to-Peer Copyright Disputes, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 1 (2005) (“In this 
article, we explain how such a dispute resolution system might work and propose 
a draft amendment to the Copyright Act to implement this system, with 
annotations to highlight some of the issues our proposal raises.”); Andrew 
Christie, The ICANN Domain-Name Dispute Resolution System as a Model for 
Resolving Other Intellectual Property Disputes on the Internet, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. 
PROP. 105, 105 (2002) (“There is no reason why . . . the availability of this remedy 
need be limited to the type of conduct currently prohibited in the UDRP . . . .”). 
 71. As this Article entered the editorial process, the Public Interest Registry, 
which operates the .org (legacy) TLD, announced that it plans to adopt a 
“Copyright Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy” in cooperation with the 
Healthy Domains Initiative. See Kevin Murphy, The Pirate Bay Likely to Be Sunk 
as .org Adopts “UDRP for Copyright,” DOMAIN INCITE (Feb. 8, 2017, 4:29 PM), 
http://domainincite.com/21517-the-pirate-bay-likely-to-be-sunk-as-org-adopts-
udrp-for-copyright (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“Under its Healthy Domains 
Initiative, the DNA is proposing a Copyright Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Policy that would enable copyright holders to get piracy web sites shut down.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The specific terms of that 
policy lie beyond the scope of this project. The Healthy Domains Initiative, which 
is applying significant pressure on DNS operators in all TLDs to go this route, is 
discussed in Part IV.A.  
 72. See infra Part IV.B (explaining the relevant ICANN contract provisions).  
 73. See Allen R. Grogan, ICANN Is Not the Internet Content Police, ICANN 
(June 12, 2015), https://www.icann.org/news/blog/icann-is-not-the-internet-
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out of deep divisions within the stakeholder community—and, by 
extension, within ICANN’s leadership—over the scope of ICANN’s 
mission as the internet evolves.74 The organization is struggling to 
find a way to answer right holders’ demands without running afoul 
of its limited technical role. That may be an impossible compromise 
to strike, however. 
Concern that ICANN is stepping onto a slippery slope by 
trying to accommodate copyright holders is legitimate. The more 
ICANN shows itself to be open to the idea that DNS intermediaries 
are appropriate content regulators, the more categories of content 
those intermediaries will likely be pressured to regulate. For 
example, many governments want ICANN, through DNS 
intermediaries, to help law enforcement police content that is 
unlawful under local law, including blasphemy, hate speech, and 
child pornography.75 Their requests raise difficult questions about 
Internet jurisdiction and extraterritoriality that ICANN is not in 
a position to resolve, given its narrow technical mandate.76 The 
brouhaha over copyright is, in the end, a microcosm of a broader 
                                                                                                     
content-police (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“Allow me to say this clearly and 
succinctly—ICANN is not a global regulator of Internet Content . . . .”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Significantly, ICANN did not 
mandate any protocol for copyright or anti-counterfeiting enforcement in the new 
gTLDs when it required new gTLD intermediaries to adopt the URS procedure 
for cybersquatting.  
 74. See Shane Tews, 3 Strategies for Keeping ICANN and IANA on Mission 
and out of Politics, TECHPOLICYDAILY (Sept. 10, 2015, 6:00 AM), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160312155239/http://www.techpolicydaily.com/int
ernet/icann-and-iana-on-mission/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“[C]an ICANN be 
trusted to be a good steward of the Internet’s future?”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 75. See Grogan, supra note 73 (describing the range of online content that 
some government stakeholders would like to have ICANN play a role in 
censoring); MILTON L. MUELLER, NETWORKS AND STATES: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF 
INTERNET GOVERNANCE 197 (2010) (“More governments and censorship advocates 
have begun to think that blocking or ‘filtering’ techniques [within the DNS] could 
recreate the kind of control they once had over traditional territorial media.”). 
 76. See MUELLER, supra note 75, at 201 (“A true ‘technical coordinator’ role 
implies that ICANN would be indifferent to any social goals other than its 
fundamental one of maintaining the global uniqueness of domain names . . . . This 
implies neutrality with respect to social outcomes unrelated to that basic 
mission.”).  
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struggle within ICANN over the purpose and direction of the newly 
independent organization.  
A. The Background: From Congress to ICANN 
Right holders’ anti-piracy aspirations for the DNS entered the 
public’s consciousness in 2011 with a notorious piece of failed 
legislation called the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA).77 Through 
SOPA, copyright holders sought to expand enforcement of their 
rights into the DNS (among other online systems, including 
payment systems and advertising networks).78 The bill authorized 
the Attorney General to obtain court orders compelling ISPs 
operating non-authoritative domain name servers79 to block access 
to “foreign infringing sites” by disrupting the normal technical 
                                                                                                     
 77. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011). The ideas 
underlying SOPA had been percolating in policy circles, through entertainment 
industry proxies, as early as 2009. See, e.g., DANIEL CASTRO, RICHARD BENNETT & 
SCOTT M. ANDES, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., STEAL THESE POLICIES: 
STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING DIGITAL PIRACY 3 (2009), http://www.itif.org/files/2009-
digital-piracy.pdf (promoting site blocking “at the ISP level”). In 2010, a bill called 
COICA, which contained provisions similar to those that later appeared in SOPA, 
was introduced in the Senate but failed to advance. See Combating Online 
Infringement and Counterfeits Act, S. 3804, 111th Cong. (2010) (seeking to create 
enforcement mechanisms against “rogue websites”). 
 78. See Annemarie Bridy, Internet Payment Blockades, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1523, 
1540–42 (2015) (explaining SOPA’s DNS blocking provisions). 
 79. A non-authoritative domain name server, sometimes called a “caching 
server,” is one that stores a cache of all domain name lookup requests for which 
it has received a response from a registry-maintained authoritative domain name 
server in the past. See DANIEL KARRENBERG, THE INTERNET DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM 
EXPLAINED FOR NON-EXPERTS 2 (2004), https://www.internetsociety.org/internet-
domain-name-system-explained-non-experts-daniel-karrenberg (“Your computer 
knows the address of a nearby DNS ‘caching server’ and will send the query 
there.”). Residential and commercial broadband providers (ISPs) operate caching 
name servers to respond efficiently to their subscribers’ queries. Id. Thanks to 
local caching servers, many DNS requests need never be routed through the 
actual infrastructure of the DNS, which decreases processing burdens on the 
system as a whole. Id. Authoritative domain name servers for TLDs are controlled 
by their respective registries. SIGNPOSTS, supra note 2, at 133. For each TLD, 
there are redundant authoritative domain name servers (“slave” servers), but 
there is a single primary (“master”) server for that TLD. The master server stores 
the TLD’s authoritative zone file—the database that links all domain names to 
their corresponding Internet Protocol (IP) addresses for navigational purposes. 
Id. at 90.  
NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN 1363 
process by which domain names resolve to their underlying IP 
addresses.80  
When SOPA unexpectedly—and spectacularly—sank, just as 
it seemed ready to sail through Congress, right holders turned 
their attention to ICANN, a forum below the radar of the powerful 
coalition of tech companies and grassroots organizations that had 
mobilized to defeat SOPA.81 At the time, ICANN’s new gTLD 
project was already underway.82 In the mix were .movie and 
.music, “strings” of special interest to the MPAA and the RIAA.83  
In ICANN’s cycle of meetings involving the governance and 
roll out of the new gTLDs, the MPAA and the RIAA saw an 
opportunity to enhance ICANN’s intellectual property 
                                                                                                     
 80. SOPA, supra note 77, at § 102. Under pre-existing law, a “domestic” 
domain name—meaning one registered in the United States—could be seized ex 
parte on a showing of probable cause to believe that the name was being used to 
facilitate criminal copyright infringement. See 18 U.S.C. § 2323 (2012) (“[I]n 
imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense . . . shall order . . . that the 
person forfeit to the United States Government any property subject to forfeiture 
under subsection (a) . . . .”). SOPA would have expanded the field of DNS 
enforcement to reach activity on “foreign” sites—meaning those registered in and 
operated from jurisdictions outside the United States. I enclose the words 
domestic and foreign in quotation marks to highlight the fact that Internet names 
and addresses are purely logical and do not actually correspond to physical 
geography. 
 81. See Amy Goodman, The SOPA Blackout Protest Makes History, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
cifamerica/2012/jan/18/sopa-blackout-protest-makes-history (last visited Sept. 
20, 2017) (reporting on the unprecedented breadth and scale of the public 
campaign to block SOPA from becoming law) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 82. See New Generic Top-Level Domains: About the Program, ICANN, 
https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/about/program (last visited Sept. 19, 2017) 
(explaining the history of the new gTLD program) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 83. ICANN delegated .movie, meaning it assigned responsibility for the new 
TLD to a registry and added it to the DNS Root Zone, in 2015. New Generic Top 
Level Domains: Delegated Strings, ICANN, https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/ 
program-status/delegated-strings (last visited Sept. 19, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Delegation of .music has been complicated by 
the fact that ICANN received eight competing applications to control it, making 
it a “contested string.”  New gTLD String Similarity Contention Sets, ICANN, 
https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus/stringcontentionstatus 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
When this article went to press, .music was still not delegated.  
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enforcement mandate to include non-judicial, DNS-based (and 
therefore global) remedies for copyright infringement.84 MPAA and 
RIAA representatives, backed by the IPC, demanded that ICANN 
and its new gTLD contractors promote a “safe internet ecosystem” 
by enforcing their members’ copyrights in films and music.85  
A campaign for concerted, private anti-piracy enforcement 
within the DNS—branded the “Healthy Domains Initiative”—is 
being spearheaded with ICANN’s approval86 by the IPC and the 
recently launched Domain Name Association (DNA), a trade group 
that represents the interests of DNS intermediaries participating 
in the new gTLD program.87 Donuts and Radix are both 
                                                                                                     
 84. See David Post, ICANN, Copyright Infringement, and “the Public 
Interest,” WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 9, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/09/icann-
copyright-infringement-and-the-public-interest/?utm_term=.2586b26c9234 (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2017) (reporting on the MPAA and RIAA’s campaign to involve 
ICANN directly in copyright enforcement) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). Cf. MUELLER, supra note 75, at 141 (“We are currently in a 
period . . . in which state and corporate advocates of intellectual property 
protection propose ever harsher and more systemic interventions into the ecology 
of information-communication technology . . . .”). 
 85. Post, supra note 84; see also Letter from Victoria Sheckler, Deputy Gen. 
Counsel, RIAA, to Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Bd., ICANN, and Fadi 
Chehade, CEO, ICANN 1 (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/ 
correspondence/riaa-to-icann-05mar15-en.pdf  
[O]ur overriding concerns are to ensure that the internet ecosystem is 
a safe, vibrant, and innovative place where legitimate music creation, 
access, and distribution can thrive. In light of this, we expect all in the 
internet ecosystem to take responsible measures to deter copyright 
infringement to help meet this goal.  
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 86. The Healthy Domains Initiative ran a meeting alongside the 2016 
ICANN meeting in Marrakesh, with ICANN’s head of contractual compliance in 
attendance. See MEETING TRANSCRIPT, supra note 69, at 1 (“I’m Allen Grogan. I’m 
the Chief Compliance Officer at ICANN.”).  At an earlier meeting in Dublin, 
ICANN’s leadership “encouraged a community discussion on establishing a 
voluntary framework to handle contractual obligations relating to content.” BRIAN 
J. WINTERFELDT ET AL., FOUR KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM ICANN 54, at 5 (2015), 
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/185ad1ed-e701-4be3-85a5-
86a5ad97ad7a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a91bdeae-4f07-41c7-8b43-
5fdd096223b5/151117-UPDATE-IP.pdf.   
 87. See The Domain Name Association Launches Healthy Domains Initiative 
as Industry-Led Effort to Evolve Internet Naming Ecosystem, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 
16, 2016, 9:08 AM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-domain-
name-association-launches-healthy-domains-initiative-as-industry-led-effort-to-
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members.88 The DNA’s stated motivation for cooperation with 
right holders is to “appease . . . pressures” coming from “outside.”89 
In its public-facing rhetoric, the DNA positions the trusted notifier 
program as “a positive example of self-governing.”90 What the 
DNA’s characterization of the trusted notifier program obscures, 
however, is the fact that registrants—and not the registries 
themselves—are the ultimate regulatory targets of the program, 
which they played no part in shaping. For ICANN, describing the 
trusted notifier program as a form of voluntary “self-governance” 
for registries diverts attention from the uncomfortable fact that the 
program is, in fact, a new form of DNS governance that draws its 
legal force from ICANN’s web of contracts with DNS 
intermediaries.91 
Under the anodyne rubric of “Public Interest Commitments,” 
the IPC successfully lobbied ICANN for the creation of a top-down 
contractual infrastructure for DNS intermediaries that supports a 
privately ordered system of copyright notice and takedown for 
entire second-level domains.92 In short, right holders achieved 
                                                                                                     
evolve-internet-naming-ecosystem-300220548.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) 
(listing participants in the HDI’s first “summit”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  According to the DNA’s website, the organization’s mission is 
“[t]o promote the interest of the domain name industry by advocating the use, 
adoption, and expansion of domain names as the primary tool for users to 
navigate the Internet.” What is the Domain Name Association?, DOMAIN NAME 
ASS’N, http://www.thedna.org/what-is-the-domain-name-association/ (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 88. List of Members, DOMAIN NAME ASS’N, http://www.thedna.org/current-
dna-members/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 89. MEETING TRANSCRIPT, supra note 69, at 3–4. 
 90. The Domain Name Association Launches Healthy Domains Initiative as 
Industry-Led Effort to Evolve Internet Naming Ecosystem, supra note 87. 
 91. See Weitzenboeck, supra note 21, at 54 (“Governance of the gTLD 
namespace is contractual, with a web of contracts spun between, respectively, 
ICANN, registries, registrars, data escrow providers and eventually between the 
registrants and the registrars with which they deal.”). 
 92. See The Domain Name Association Launches Healthy Domains Initiative 
as Industry-Led Effort to Evolve Internet Naming Ecosystem, supra note 87 
(explaining how the Public Interest Commitments, or PICs, came into existence); 
Letter from Steven J. Metalitz, Counsel for the Coal. for Online Accountability, 
to Goran Marby, Pres. and CEO of ICANN 1 (June 17, 2016), 
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/metalitz-to-marby-17jun 
16-en.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Metalitz to Marby] (“IPC considers these PIC 
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through ICANN as a matter of private ordering the site-blocking 
remedy for “pirate sites” in new gTLDs that they failed to get for 
all gTLDs through SOPA. The ICANN program may even be 
preferable from their point of view, because it requires no judicial 
intervention at all.93 
B. ICANN’s Legal Infrastructure for DNS-Based Copyright 
Enforcement 
The trusted notifier program, unlike the UDRP, is not 
ICANN’s program; however, ICANN laid the legal foundation for 
it through mandatory provisions in its contracts with DNS 
intermediaries—similar to those that make the UDRP binding on 
all registrants.94 ICANN requires all registry operators for the new 
gTLDs to execute its 2013 ICANN-Registry Agreement, which 
contains a set of standard terms known as Specification 11—Public 
Interest Commitments.95 One of the terms in Specification 11 is a 
pass-along, or flow-down, provision requiring registry operators to 
include in their contracts with registrars a provision requiring 
registrars to include in their contracts with registrants “a 
                                                                                                     
obligations to be essential safeguards that must be vigorously enforced in order 
to promote the healthy development of the new gTLD namespace.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). The PICs provision is “Specification 11” in 
the ICANN Registry Agreement. ICANN, REGISTRY AGREEMENT § 2.17, 
Specification 11 (2013), https://newgtlds.icann.org/sites/default/files/agreements/ 
agreement-approved-31jul17-en.pdf (listing the public interest commitments in 
the Registry Agreement).  
 93. See infra Part C (describing the program’s procedures, which are 
completely non-judicial). 
 94. See Froomkin, Almost Free, supra note 19, at 214  
By requiring the registries—as a condition of being listed in the root—
to require the registrars to include standard form terms in their 
contracts with registrants, ICANN gains a degree of control over 
registrants, at least to the extent that a registrar could impose terms 
in a contract with the end-user. To date, ICANN has used this power 
only for matters ostensibly relating to trademark issues raised by 
domain name registrations, most notably its imposition of the Uniform 
Domain Name Process (“UDRP”) . . . .  
 95. ICANN, REGISTRY AGREEMENT § 2.17, Specification 11 (2013), 
https://newgtlds.icann.org/sites/default/files/agreements/agreement-approved-31 
jul17-en.pdf.  
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provision prohibiting Registered Name Holders from . . . piracy, 
trademark or copyright infringement, . . . and providing 
(consistent with applicable law and any related procedures) 
consequences for such activities including suspension of the 
domain name.”96 Through this provision, an express prohibition on 
copyright infringement and the identification of consequences for 
it are pushed down from ICANN to registry operators to 
registrars.97 
The endpoint in this cascade of contractual obligations is, of 
course, the registrant, whose registration is conditioned on her 
acceptance of the prospect that her domain name may be 
suspended if she is found to have engaged in piracy or copyright 
infringement.98 The flow-down provision raises a number of 
interpretive questions, however, to which the contract as a whole 
provides no clear answers. For example, who has the authority to 
determine whether a registrant has engaged in copyright 
infringement? A court of law? The registrar? A right holder 
complaining to the registrar? There is also ambiguity concerning 
the imposition of consequences. Does the provision create a duty or 
just a right on behalf of the registrar to impose consequences for 
infringement? What “applicable law” and “related procedures” 
does the provision contemplate as principles guiding or limiting 
the suspension of domain names?  
Right holders have taken the position with ICANN that 
registrars have a contractual duty not only to include Specification 
11’s anti-infringement provision in their registration agreements, 
but also to enforce it by suspending registered domain names in 
response to right holder reports of “abuse.”99 The ICANN 2013 
                                                                                                     
 96. Id. 
 97. See Froomkin, Almost Free, supra note 19, at 214 (explaining how this 
structure works to bind registrants to the UDRP). Note that the inclusion of 
trademark infringement in the list of actionable activity under Specification 11 
flies in the face of the UDRP’s (and the URS’s) limited scope for cybersquatting. 
 98. See ICANN, REGISTRY AGREEMENT § 2.17, Specification 11 (2013), 
https://newgtlds.icann.org/sites/default/files/agreements/agreement-approved-
31jul17-en.pdf (requiring “Registrars to include in their Registration Agreements 
a provision prohibiting Registered Name Holders from . . . piracy . . . or copyright 
infringement” that would trigger “suspension of the domain name”).  
 99. See Allen R. Grogan, Community Outreach on Interpretation and 
Enforcement of the 2013 RAA (Registrar Accreditation Agreement), ICANN (June 
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Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) requires registrars to 
maintain an “abuse contact” to receive “reports of Illegal Activity” 
involving domain names for which they provide services.100 It 
further requires registrars to “take reasonable and prompt steps 
to investigate and respond appropriately to any reports of 
abuse.”101 ICANN requires any registrar that wants to register 
domain names in new gTLDs to execute the 2013 version of the 
RAA.102 
Reading the anti-infringement flow-down provision in 
Specification 11 together with the anti-abuse provision in the RAA, 
right holders have argued to ICANN’s contractual compliance staff 
that registrars breach their obligations to ICANN if they fail to 
implement notice and takedown for domain names associated with 
alleged pirate sites.103 As with the anti-infringement provision in 
Specification 11, however, the RAA’s broad anti-abuse provision 
raises compliance questions to which the agreement as a whole 
provides no clear answers. What conduct on the part of a registrant 
or users of the registrant’s website qualifies as “abuse”? What 
information must a “report” contain? What are “reasonable steps” 
for investigating a report of abuse or illegal activity? What does it 
mean for a registrar to “respond appropriately” to a right holder’s 
report of illegal activity when the activity in question is merely 
alleged and not judicially proven? From the perspective of both 
registrars and registrants, these are critical questions. 
Some registrars have taken the position that an appropriate 
response to an abuse complaint from a right holder is to inform the 
complainant that the registrar is not in a position to adjudicate the 
legality of a registrant’s activity, and the complainant should 
                                                                                                     
11, 2015), https://www.icann.org/news/blog/community-outreach-on-interpreta 
tion-and-enforcement-of-the-2013-raa (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (explaining 
that “a number of parties submitting abuse reports believe that an appropriate 
response to illegal activity requires the registrar to suspend the registered name 
holder’s domain name and requires ICANN to terminate the registrar’s 2013 RAA 
(Registrar Accreditation Agreement) if the registrar fails to do so”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 100. REGISTRAR ACCREDITATION AGREEMENT, supra note 67, § 3.18.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. 
 103. See Grogan, supra note 99 (explaining the right holders’ position). 
NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN 1369 
therefore seek redress from competent legal authorities.104 These 
registrars are unwilling to make substantive judgments about the 
legality of content accessible through domain names they have 
registered, opting to rely instead on valid legal process.105  
ICANN’s contractual compliance staff has found itself in the 
uncomfortable position of mediating the ongoing controversy over 
the legal effect of Specification 11 and its interaction with the 
anti-abuse provision in the RAA.106 ICANN took an official position 
with respect to the controversy in a letter from the chair of the 
board of directors to the president of the IPC in the summer of 
2016.107 The letter affirmed that ICANN will enforce its contracts 
with DNS intermediaries, just not in the way that right holders 
would like: 
This does not mean, however, that ICANN is required or 
qualified to make factual and legal determinations as to 
whether a Registered Name Holder or a website operator is 
violating applicable laws and governmental regulations, and to 
assess what would constitute an appropriate remedy for such 
activities in any particular situation.108 
Some members of the IPC have accused ICANN of “backtracking” 
on Specification 11 by failing to adopt a policy of terminating 
accreditation for both registrars that do not suspend registered 
domain names in response to right holder allegations of piracy and 
registries that do not require registrars to do so.109 
                                                                                                     
 104. See id. (explaining the position of unspecified registrars that a judicial 
determination of infringement may legitimately be regarded under the agreement 
as a reasonable precondition for suspension). 
 105. Id. 
 106. ICANN provides a formal means through its contractual compliance 
program for third parties to complain that an accredited DNS intermediary is not 
living up to its legal obligations to ICANN. For further discussion and examples 
of ICANN’s contractual compliance procedures, see Contractual Compliance, 
ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/compliance-2012-02-25-en (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 107. Letter from Stephen D. Crocker, Chair of the Bd., ICANN, to Greg 
Shatan, President, Intellectual Prop. Constituency 1 (June 30, 2016), 
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/crocker-to-shatan-30jun16 
-en.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Crocker to Shatan]. 
 108. Id.  
 109. See Kevin Murphy, Fight as ICANN “Backtracks” on Piracy Policing, 
DOMAIN INCITE (July 1, 2016, 8:49 AM), http://domainincite.com/20692-fight-as-
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On its face, Specification 11 mandates only that registrars 
include the anti-infringement provision in their registration 
agreements, not that they interpret and enforce the provision in the 
way that right holders demand.110 As nonparties to both the RAA 
(between ICANN and registrars) and registrars’ contracts with 
registrants, right holders have no standing to demand enforcement 
of either contract’s terms.111 To backstop this default rule of 
privity, ICANN’s RAA contains an express provision stipulating 
that there are no third party beneficiaries to the agreement.112 
ICANN and its accredited registrars are thus insulated from 
breach of contract claims by right holders who might otherwise be 
inclined to test the meaning of Specification 11 and the anti-abuse 
provision in court.  
ICANN’s contractual compliance staff has so far supported 
registrars that elect not to treat right holder complaints of 
infringement as actionable proof of abuse or illegal conduct.113 
However, with the inclusion of the flow-down provision in 
Specification 11 of the ICANN-Registry agreement and the 
anti-abuse provision in the 2013 version of the RAA, ICANN has 
opened a Pandora’s box with respect to content regulation that it 
may ultimately be unable to close, particularly in light of the IPC’s 
power within ICANN.114 
                                                                                                     
icann-backtracks-on-piracy-policing (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“New gTLD 
registries are not going to be held accountable for domains used for content 
piracy.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 110. ICANN, REGISTRY AGREEMENT § 2.17, Specification 11 (2013), 
https://newgtlds.icann.org/sites/default/files/agreements/agreement-approved-31 
jul17-en.pdf.  
 111. See 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37:1 (4th ed.) (explaining the common 
law rule of privity and the exception for intended third-party beneficiaries). 
 112. See REGISTRAR ACCREDITATION AGREEMENT, supra note 67, § 7.5 (“This 
Agreement shall not be construed to create any obligation by either ICANN or 
Registrar to any non-party to this Agreement, including any Registered Name 
Holder.”). 
 113. See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text (explaining difficulties 
registrars face in “evaluating alleged violations of law”). 
 114. Changes to ICANN’s by-laws, for which the IPC successfully lobbied in 
2016, may make it difficult going forward for ICANN to rely on its technical 
mission as a reason for holding the line on Crocker and Grogan’s interpretation 
of Specification 11.  See Letter from Metalitz to Marby, supra note 92, at 2 
Furthermore, the revisions to the ICANN by-laws that the Board 
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C. The MPAA’s “Trusted Notifier” Program 
As mentioned above, ICANN has been supportive of voluntary 
enforcement agreements between DNS intermediaries and right 
holders and has facilitated them through Specification 11 and the 
2013 RAA.115 While controversy swirls within ICANN over how to 
interpret those terms, Donuts and Radix agreed in the spring of 
2016 to partner with the MPAA to implement a trusted notifier 
program covering all domain names in new gTLDs they control.116 
Donuts administers .movie in addition to hundreds of other 
gTLDs.117 Radix is an applicant for .music, which ICANN has not 
yet delegated due to unresolved competing applications.118 It 
seems all but certain, however, that Radix will add the RIAA to its 
roster of trusted notifiers if or when Radix gains control of .music. 
According to a brief summary of the program publicly released 
by Donuts and the MPAA, a “trusted notifier” is defined very 
broadly as “an industry representative trade association that 
represents no single company, a recognized no[t]-for-profit public 
interest group dedicated to examining illegal behavior, or a 
similarly situated entity with demonstrated extensive expertise in 
the area in which it operates and ability to identify and determine 
the relevant category of illegal activity.”119 The document does not 
                                                                                                     
approved just last month explicitly enshrine ICANN’s authority “to 
negotiate, enter into and enforce agreements, including public interest 
commitments,” and specifically bar any party from challenging the 
PICs or other provisions of the new gTLD registry agreements “on the 
basis that such terms and conditions conflict with, or are in violation 
of, ICANN’s Mission or otherwise exceed the scope of ICANN’s 
authority or powers.” 
(emphasis added) (quoting Revised By-Laws, §§ 1.1.d.ii, iv).  
 115. See, e.g., Letter from Crocker to Shatan, supra note 107, at 1–4 (stating 
that ICANN is both aware and supportive of the DNA’s Healthy Domains 
Initiative and associated voluntary enforcement agreements). 
 116. Press Release, Radix & MPAA, Radix and the MPAA Establish New 
Partnership to Reduce Online Piracy (May 13, 2016), http://www.mpaa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Radix-and-the-MPAA-Establish-New-Partnership-to-
Reduce-Online-Piracy.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 117. See Program Statistics, supra note 30 (showing links to ICANN’s official 
list of all delegated new gTLD strings). 
 118. Id. 
 119. CHARACTERISTICS OF A TRUSTED NOTIFIER PROGRAM 1, 
1372 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343 (2017) 
specify what makes any given group “recognized” for “examining 
illegal behavior” or what counts as “demonstrated extensive 
expertise” when it comes to qualifying as a trusted notifier.120 
Judgments about eligibility for trusted notifier status appear to be 
left to the discretion of the participating registry operator.  
As an operational matter, the registry operator agrees to treat 
the trusted notifier’s complaints “expeditiously and with a 
presumption of credibility.”121 “Expeditiously” means, “absent 
exceptional circumstances,” that the “[r]egistry will coordinate 
with the applicable registrar” and render a final decision within 
ten business days of the complaint.122 Notably, the registry has no 
obligation under the agreement to independently investigate the 
complaint before imposing a sanction, though it “may conduct its 
own investigation” if it is inclined to do so.123  
The agreement outlines a workflow in which the notifier 
complains to the registry, the registry coordinates with the 
registrar, and “as appropriate” either the “registrar (or [r]egistry if 
registrar declines) may provide” the complaint to the registrant 
with a “reasonable deadline” for a response.124 The “as 
appropriate” and “may provide” terms signal that the registrant 
                                                                                                     
https://web.archive.org/web/20160615074509/http:/www.donuts.domains:80/im
ages/pdfs/Trusted-Notifier-Summary.pdf. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. Remember, however, that the applicable registrar is obligated under 
the 2013 RAA to “investigate and respond appropriately to any reports of abuse.” 
REGISTRAR ACCREDITATION AGREEMENT, supra note 67, § 3.18. So, even if the 
registrar is not a participant in the trusted notifier program, its obligations to 
ICANN require it to take action of some (unspecified) kind in response to 
third-party reports of abuse and illegal activity. As discussed in Part IV.B, not all 
registrars agree that the RAA requires them to impose sanctions on registrants 
in response to right holder complaints, absent a court order or other legal 
authority. ICANN has publicly backed these registrars’ position, which means 
that registrars unwilling to act without a court order are a potential obstacle for 
notifiers who believe they’re entitled to be “trusted.” As an end run around 
uncooperative registrars, the trusted notifier agreement provides that the 
participating registry will simply take matters into its own hands if the applicable 
registrar declines to act. See CHARACTERISTICS OF A TRUSTED NOTIFIER PROGRAM, 
supra note 119, at 2 (providing that the registry may impose sanctions “in its 
discretion” if it agrees with the notifier’s assessment of the domain’s legality). 
 124. CHARACTERISTICS OF A TRUSTED NOTIFIER PROGRAM, supra note 119, at 2. 
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will not necessarily receive notice of the complaint or be given an 
opportunity to respond.125 If the registrant does get the chance to 
respond, how much time is “reasonable” is an open question, but 
given the ten-day window for the registry’s ultimate decision, the 
registrant’s deadline must necessarily be a very short one—no 
more than a matter of a few days. For a registrant whose business 
is dependent on his or her active domain, such a short amount of 
time for a response strains the definition of reasonableness. And 
the consequences for failing to meet a registry’s tight deadline are 
potentially final, because a registrant has neither a right to appeal 
the registry’s adverse decision nor a claim for breach of contract 
against the registry.126  
If the registry agrees with the notifier that “the domain clearly 
is devoted to abusive behavior,” then “the [r]egistry, in its 
discretion, may suspend, terminate, or place the domain on 
registry lock, hold, or similar status.”127 Because the program does 
not require the registry to actually investigate the complaint or to 
solicit a response from the registrant, there is a high risk that 
participating registries will default to a rubber stamp approach. 
Indeed, the program is designed to have DNS intermediaries 
intrinsically trust and quickly execute the notifier’s legal 
judgments. A registrant who disagrees with the registry’s 
unilateral decision could try to seek redress from ICANN through 
its contractual compliance process, but that registrant would likely 
be rebuffed in the same way that right holders have been.128 
D. The Trusted Notifier Program and the UDRP Compared 
Unlike the UDRP, the trusted notifier program is 
ICANN-enabled but not ICANN-developed or -sponsored, meaning 
that participating registries and right holders were free to 
                                                                                                     
 125. Id. 
 126. A domain name registrant has no contractual relationship with a 
registry. The registrant’s only DNS-relevant contractual relationship is with the 
registrar that registered the domain name. 
 127. CHARACTERISTICS OF A TRUSTED NOTIFIER PROGRAM, supra note 119, at 2. 
 128. Cf. Letter from Crocker to Shatan, supra note 107, at 1–4 (disavowing a 
role for ICANN in content regulation). 
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negotiate a deal mutually agreeable to them, without vetting the 
terms through ICANN’s multi-stakeholder policy development 
process.129 With the trusted notifier program, ICANN has 
facilitated a program of private, DNS-based content regulation for 
which it now disclaims responsibility and oversight.130  
The resulting set of procedures is loosely defined and heavily 
biased in favor of complainants. It altogether lacks uniform, 
substantive standards for determining what constitutes “clear and 
pervasive abusive behavior”131 that will justify a registry in 
canceling or suspending a registrant’s domain name. The publicly 
released document describing the program is completely generic 
with respect to what qualifies as actionable conduct. The program 
gives trusted notifiers an open invitation to provide a 
“[n]on-exhaustive [i]dentification of the law(s) being violated.”132 
Surprisingly, given the copyright-specific nature of the MPAA’s 
interests, the document makes no reference to copyright 
infringement at all—a worrying sign that copyright may simply be 
the thin edge of the wedge when it comes to notice-driven content 
regulation through the DNS. The UDRP, in contrast, begins and 
ends with cybersquatting, the elements of which the program’s 
procedures clearly define.133  
The UDRP and the trusted notifier program also differ 
significantly in terms of the nature and amount of information 
complainants must provide to initiate a claim. A trusted notifier’s 
complaint can consist of little more than identification of a law 
allegedly being violated, a “clear and brief” description of how the 
site is violating the law, and evidence of illegality in the form of 
sample URLs and screen shots.134 The UDRP, by contrast, requires 
                                                                                                     
 129. See MEETING TRANSCRIPT, supra note 69, at 2 (“To be clear, the Healthy 
Domains Initiative was a product of the DNA—not ICANN, not ICANN 
Contractual Compliance; we weren’t involved in it—but it’s an example of the 
kind of voluntary initiatives that I think can be constructive.”). 
 130. Id.  
 131. CHARACTERISTICS OF A TRUSTED NOTIFIER PROGRAM, supra note 119, at 2. 
 132. Id. at 1. 
 133. See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, supra note 52 
(defining applicable disputes and listing factors for determining bad faith 
registration and use of a domain name).  
 134. See CHARACTERISTICS OF A TRUSTED NOTIFIER PROGRAM, supra note 119, 
at 1 (requiring the trusted notifier to provide a “[d]etailed description of the 
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a complainant to plead a case based on explicit, published factors 
for determining a narrowly defined category of wrongful conduct—
bad faith registration and use of a domain name.135  
The trusted notifier program also differs from the UDRP in 
that the UDRP guarantees the registrant an opportunity to 
respond and, if the outcome is unfavorable, to bring a claim for 
declaratory judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction.136 An 
opportunity to respond and a right to appeal an adverse judgment 
are basic to fair process. They are especially necessary in a 
program like the trusted notifier program, which calls on registry 
employees with no particular expertise or training in the law to 
make domain-wide determinations about the legality of content 
under an unspecified range of laws from an unspecified range of 
jurisdictions, some of which may have conflicting laws on the same 
subject matter. The risk of error by inexpert decision-makers when 
so much content and so many legal variables are in play is 
obviously high. 
For all its asserted shortcomings and intimations of 
pro-complainant bias, the UDRP is at least run by accredited legal 
professionals who are tasked with applying uniform legal 
standards neutrally to the cases before them.137 Unlike registries 
                                                                                                     
abusive activity (i.e., sample URLs, screen shots); [n]on-exhaustive 
[i]dentification of the law(s) being violated by the activity; and a [c]lear and brief 
description of why the site’s activity violated the specified law(s)”). 
 135. See Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN 
(Sept. 28, 2013), https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/udrp-rules-2015-03-11-
en (last visited Oct 12., 2017) (listing the required elements of a complaint) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 136. See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, supra note 52 
(providing that a registrant may file a lawsuit within 10 days of receiving an 
adverse result in a UDRP proceeding, and that the UDRP remedy will be stayed 
pending the outcome of the litigation). Similar protections are guaranteed under 
the new URS procedure. See URS, supra note 67, § 13 (“The URS Determination 
shall not preclude any other remedies available to the appellant, such as UDRP 
(if appellant is the Complainant), or other remedies as may be available in a court 
of competent jurisdiction.”). 
 137. See Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, supra 
note 135  
A Panelist shall be impartial and independent and shall have, before 
accepting appointment, disclosed to the Provider any circumstances 
giving rise to justifiable doubt as to the Panelist’s impartiality or 
independence. If, at any stage during the administrative proceeding, 
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participating in the trusted notifier program, UDRP adjudicators 
are never expected to give complainants the benefit of the doubt 
when deciding the merits of a complaint.138 Whether they do or not 
in practice is subject to debate, but there is certainly no 
pro-complainant bias written into the UDRP, as there is written 
into the trusted notifier program.139  
V. Understanding the Stakes and Consequences 
This section pulls back from the legal and operational 
mechanics of the trusted notifier program to consider what notice 
and takedown in the DNS means for right holders, domain name 
registrants, Internet users, and the future of the DNS.  I explain 
why right holders want content regulation through the DNS; why 
registrants and Internet users are wise to resist it; and how 
ICANN, by facilitating the MPAA program, has compromised its 
institutional mission to protect the technical integrity and content 
neutrality of the DNS. 
A. A Cheap and Efficient Process for Right Holders 
From the perspective of right holders, the DNS is a much more 
efficient field for copyright enforcement than courts are. Thorny 
questions of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and choice of law can be 
avoided when DNS intermediaries agree to privately adjudicate 
and remedy claims of online infringement.140 Litigation over 
                                                                                                     
new circumstances arise that could give rise to justifiable doubt as to 
the impartiality or independence of the Panelist, that Panelist shall 
promptly disclose such circumstances to the Provider. In such event, 
the Provider shall have the discretion to appoint a substitute Panelist. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id.  
 140. The problems associated with public adjudication of cross-border 
intellectual property disputes are illustrated clearly in the Canadian case of 
Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, a trademark and trade secrets case in which the 
trial court ordered Google, a nonparty, to delist all of the defendants’ second-level 
domains from search results on a global basis (i.e., in all TLDs). See Equustek 
Sols. Inc. v. Jack, [2014] 374 D.L.R. (4th) 537 (B.C.S.C.). The Supreme Court of 
Canada upheld the global injunction. See Google Inc. v. Equustek Sols. Inc., 
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“pirate sites” is expensive. Defendants are often located outside the 
United States and decline to submit to the jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts. Plaintiffs in such cases can (and do) seek injunctions 
against nonparty intermediaries, including DNS intermediaries, 
requiring them to cut off services to non-cooperative defendants.141 
Such injunctions, however, are subject to due process challenge, 
because the enjoined intermediaries are strangers to the litigation 
and operate at arm’s length from the adjudicated infringers.142  
If copyrights are privately enforced in the DNS through a 
notice-and-takedown protocol, accused operators of “pirate sites” 
can be brought to heel entirely outside the machinery of public 
courts. All it takes is a simple notice from a complaining right 
holder and a quick edit to a database—the zone file for the TLD in 
which the domain name for the offending site is registered. From 
a purely technical standpoint, once due process barriers are 
removed and a DNS intermediary agrees to cooperate, blocking 
public access to a website by preventing the site’s domain name 
from resolving to the registrant’s chosen Internet Protocol (IP) 
address is trivially easy.  
                                                                                                     
[2017] 279 A.C.W.S. (3d) 822 (Can.). Google challenged the order in U.S. court, 
arguing that the Canadian court lacked jurisdiction to order delisting on a global 
basis, and that the order violates both the First Amendment and principles of 
international comity. See Google Inc. v. Equustek Sols. Inc., et al., 
No.-5:17-cv-04207 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2017). 
 141. See, e.g., Elsevier Inc. v. www.Sci-Hub.org, No. 15 CIV. 4282 RWS, 2015 
WL 6657363, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2015) (ordering nonparty “TLD Registries 
for the Defendants’ websites, or their administrators, [to] place the [Defendant’s] 
domain names on registryHold/serverHold as well as serverUpdate, serverDelete, 
and serverTransfer prohibited statuses, until further Order of the Court”); see 
also ABS-CBN Int’l v. FreePinoyChannel.com, No. 15-61002-CIV-
DIMITROULEAS/SNOW, 2015 WL 11023803, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 2015) 
(purporting to bind domain name registrars); Preliminary Injunction at 1, Arista 
Records, LLC v. Tkach, No. 1:15-CV-03701-AJN (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2015), ECF No. 
53 (purporting to bind “domain name registrars, domain name registries, and 
Internet service providers.”). 
 142. See Annemarie Bridy, Three Notice Failures in Copyright Law, 96 B.U. 
L. REV. 777, 818–29 (2016) (arguing that such orders are in most cases 
impermissible under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because 
courts issue them with no hearing or fact-finding on the question of “active concert 
or participation” by the enjoined nonparty).  
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B. A Problematic Process for Registrants and Users 
From the perspective of registrants and website users, 
however, privately administered blocking of entire Internet 
domains raises serious issues relating to transparency, fair 
process, and freedom of expression. The threat of accidental 
over-blocking looms large considering past experiences with DNS 
blocking of child pornography and sexually explicit content deemed 
harmful to minors.143 In 2011, when the FBI seized MOOO.COM, 
84,000 subdomains were shut down in an effort to seize just ten.144 
In an earlier effort to target websites distributing material 
“harmful to minors,” ISPs implementing legislatively mandated 
domain blocking took hundreds of thousands of innocent sites 
offline to eliminate a handful that were actually distributing 
material prohibited by the statute.145  
These incidents of massive over-blocking show that the 
potential for collateral damage to lawful speech is substantial 
where the targets of enforcement are not individual files or URLs 
but entire second-level domains. That potential is even more acute 
in cases involving copyrights than it is in cases involving child 
pornography, because infringing content online is harder to 
confidently identify on cursory inspection.146  
                                                                                                     
 143. See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 610 (E.D. 
Pa. 2004) (discussing an example of blocking sexually explicit content deemed 
harmful to minors); see also Matt Liebowitz & Paul Wagenseil, Oops! Child-Porn 
Seizure Shuts Down 84,000 Innocent Sites, NBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2011), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/41649634/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/oops 
-child-porn-seizure-shuts-down-innocent-sites/#.V79A3zV76Hx (last visited Oct. 
12, 2017) (discussing an example of blocking child pornography) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 144. See Liebowitz & Wagenseil, supra note 143 (describing the results of the 
MOOO.COM subdomain seizures). 
 145. See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 651  
Verizon blocked hundreds of thousands of web sites unrelated 
to . . . targeted child pornography when it used DNS filtering to block 
access to a sub-page of the Terra.es web site, a large online 
community[website]. . . . One [blocked website] was for a Spanish 
geological survey, and defendant acknowledged that [it] did not contain 
child pornography. 
 146. See, e.g., Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 96–97 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (explaining why it is difficult for an ordinary person to ascertain 
whether a sound recording posted to the Internet—even a popular or highly 
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Over-blocking has also been an issue in copyright 
enforcement, with recent research showing high variability in the 
quality and accuracy of right holder takedown demands under the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).147 Even sophisticated 
right holders acting in good faith make flagrant mistakes with 
takedown notices.148 For example, Warner Bros. studios recently 
demanded in a single notice that Google remove links in search 
results to Warner’s own website, authorized video streaming 
services including Amazon and Sky, and the popular film 
information service IMDB.149 Some DMCA notifiers given 
“trusted” status by ISPs have engaged in takedown practices that 
strongly suggest intentional abuse.150 Google reported in a recent 
submission to the U.S. Copyright Office that 99.95% of all 
“infringing” links identified in notices from right holders 
participating in the firm’s Trusted Copyright Removal Program 
(TCRP) were entirely fabricated.151 Such a statistic counsels 
                                                                                                     
recognizable recording—is copyright infringement). 
 147. See Jennifer M. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice 
28 (UC Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 2755628, 2016), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2755628 (concluding, based on thousands of 
observations, that notice and takedown’s effectiveness is highly dependent on who 
is using it and how it is practiced). 
 148. See, e.g., Warner Brothers Reports Own Site as Illegal, BBC (Sept. 5, 
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37275603 (last visited Oct. 12, 2017) 
(noting a flagrant takedown notice mistake involving Warner Brothers and 
Google) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 149. See id. (“Film studio Warner Brothers has asked Google to remove its 
own website from search results, saying it violates copyright laws.”). 
 150. See Section 512 Study: Request for Additional Comments, Comments of 
Google to the U.S. Copyright Office (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.scribd.com/ 
document/340085542/Google-Additional-Comments-USCO-Section-512-Study# 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2017) (highlighting widespread abuse in takedown practices) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 151. Id. at 7. Google’s search algorithm considers the number of DMCA 
notices received for specific sites and down-ranks sites for which a high number 
of notices are received. See GOOGLE, HOW GOOGLE FIGHTS PIRACY 40–41 (2016), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwxyRPFduTN2TmpGajJ6TnRLaDA/view 
(showing how this design gives notifiers an incentive to vastly overstate the 
amount of infringement occurring on sites they would like to see dramatically 
down-ranked). 
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healthy skepticism about the wisdom of trust-based takedown 
regimes.152  
The technical ease with which DNS enforcement can be 
accomplished further raises the risk of over-enforcement. Error 
costs are low for intermediaries, because they are generally 
insulated from liability to their customers through disclaimers in 
their terms of service.153 By contrast, a business with a wrongfully 
blocked domain name may suffer irreparable harm, particularly if 
it has no way to appeal an open-ended suspension or an outright 
cancellation. Considering the magnitude of the over-blocking risk, 
technical precision, fair process, and competent, neutral 
adjudication are extremely important where domain name 
suspensions and cancellations are employed to police website 
content.154 
There is some question, too, about the efficacy of site blocking 
by DNS intermediaries when determined infringers are 
involved.155 While preventing a domain name from resolving to its 
corresponding IP address deters the vast majority of users from 
reaching a particular website, DNS blocking does not actually 
remove any allegedly infringing content from the Internet.156 
                                                                                                     
 152. See GOOGLE, supra note 151, at 40 (describing how Google gives trusted 
status in the TCRP to 114 unnamed right holder “partners”). 
 153. See, e.g., GoDaddy Domain Name Registration Agreement, GODADDY, 
https://www.godaddy.com/agreements/showdoc.aspx?pageid=REG_SA (last 
updated July 11, 2017) (last visited Oct. 12, 2017) (giving the domain name 
registrar broad authority to “cancel the registration of a domain name . . . if that 
name is being used, as determined by GoDaddy in its sole discretion, in 
association with spam or morally objectionable activities,” including but not 
limited to “[a]ctivities prohibited by the laws of the United States and/or foreign 
territories in which you conduct business”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 154. Id. 
 155. See, e.g., UK Site Blocking Gives Boost to Pirate Linking Sites, 
TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 2, 2015), https://torrentfreak.com/uk-site-blocking-gives-
boost-to-pirate-linking-sites-150102/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2017) (discussing the 
use of VPNs and proxies as a way of circumventing ISP-imposed domain blocking) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 156. See CDT, THE PERILS OF USING THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM TO ADDRESS 
UNLAWFUL INTERNET CONTENT 2–3 (2011), https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/Perils-
DNS-blocking.pdf (characterizing DNS web content policing as ineffective, with 
overbreadth impacting technology, compromising cybersecurity, and creating 
disputes). 
NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN 1381 
Anyone who knows the IP address for a website whose domain 
name is blocked can (in many common server configurations) 
access the site directly by entering its IP address, in lieu of the 
domain name, into a browser address bar.157 Ordinary users may 
not know that they can circumvent DNS blocks in this way, but 
moderately sophisticated users—a group to which steadfast 
“pirates” usually belong—are wise to this workaround.158 
C. A Process Outside ICANN’s Authority and Competence 
For those who understand both ICANN’s limited remit and the 
operation of the DNS, drawing a bright line between trademark 
and copyright enforcement through the DNS is easy enough to do. 
Although trademarks and copyrights are both forms of intellectual 
property, policing trademarks in domain names and policing 
copyrights in content underlying domain names are demonstrably 
different propositions. The use of trademarks in domain names at 
least arguably implicates an addressing function that could 
concern ICANN: The ability of an Internet user to reach the 
website for a brand of goods or services when she enters a domain 
name containing that brand’s word mark into the address bar of 
her web browser. For example, a user looking for Pandora Internet 
Radio might expect to find it at Pandora.com. If the user were to 
find instead the website for Pandora jewelry or iHeartRadio, her 
resulting confusion—potentially actionable under trademark 
law—could conceivably be characterized as an addressing 
problem.159  
                                                                                                     
 157. See id. at 2 (explaining the workaround).  
 158. See id. (theorizing that “[s]avvy users could . . . [avoid] any DNS servers 
that have been ordered to block”). 
 159. Glynn Lunney and Jennifer Rothman have both argued that courts over 
the years have went overboard in protecting trademarks in domain names, 
particularly with respect to so-called initial interest confusion, which is seldom 
material to a consumer’s ultimate purchasing decision. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., 
Trademarks and the Internet: The United States’ Experience, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 
931, 935 (2007) (discussing the origin of the “radically overbroad Internet form” 
of the initial interest confusion doctrine); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest 
Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
105, 108 (2005) (arguing that the doctrine of initial interest confusion violates 
both the Lanham Act and the First Amendment).  
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Online copyright infringement is different.160 It surely creates 
problems and causes actionable harms for copyright holders, but 
those problems and harms are external to the navigational 
operation of the DNS.161 Michael Froomkin made exactly this point 
in 2011, with respect to then-circulating proposals that ICANN 
expand its regulatory portfolio beyond cybersquatting to reach 
other claims, including copyright infringement: 
These suggestions have all differed from the UDRP in one 
critical fashion: whatever its merits or evils, the UDRP is 
designed to combat an ill—cybersquatting—that is a direct 
result of the structure of the DNS. In contrast, all of the other 
proposals that have bubbled up from time to time involve harms 
that are not direct results of the DNS; they may be torts or 
crimes that result from use of the Internet, but they are not 
specific to the DNS, and so far ICANN, to its credit, has shown 
no appetite for taking them on.162 
Time has shown that Froomkin was right to qualify his optimism 
about ICANN’s restraint. The foregoing discussion of ICANN’s 
facilitating role in the MPAA–Donuts/MPAA−Radix trusted 
notifier program demonstrates that ICANN has at least some 
appetite for using the DNS as a means of regulating online 
                                                                                                     
Recent case law, however, suggests that those excesses are being corrected. See, 
e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 
2010) 
Outside the special case of trademark.com, or domains that actively 
claim affiliation with the trademark holder, consumers don’t form any 
firm expectations about the sponsorship of a website until they’ve seen 
the landing page—if then. This is sensible agnosticism, not consumer 
confusion . . . . So long as the site as a whole does not suggest 
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder, such momentary 
uncertainty does not preclude a finding of nominative fair use. 
 160. ICANN long ago recognized that online trademark infringement, writ 
large, is also different—when it limited the UDRP to claims of cybersquatting 
despite pressure from trademark holders to broaden the program’s scope to 
include claims of trademark infringement and dilution arising from website 
content (e.g., offers to sell counterfeit products). See supra Part III (discussing the 
intentionally narrow scope of the UDRP). By limiting the UDRP to address-based 
trademark claims, ICANN in the early days steered clear of content regulation.   
 161. See Froomkin, Almost Free, supra note 19, at 215 (pointing out that 
copyright harms do not impact the navigational and addressing functions of the 
DNS). 
 162. Id. 
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content.163 It would just prefer to look the other way while registry 
operators do it—all in the name of Public Interest Commitments. 
Whereas ICANN continues to repeat the mantra that it is not in 
the business of policing content, its contracts with new gTLD 
intermediaries tell a different story—one of regulatory outsourcing 
that disserves the interests of registrants and, ultimately, Internet 
users.164  
VI. Conclusion 
The MPAA’s trusted notifier program is among a growing 
number of privately negotiated voluntary enforcement agreements 
between corporate copyright holders and Internet 
intermediaries.165 It is the first of its kind, however, to implicate 
stewards of the Internet’s core technical functions. That makes it 
different from the others in a way that should command the 
attention of those concerned with Internet infrastructure and 
governance. The subject-matter agnosticism of the published 
program description is also cause for alarm, suggesting that the 
program could expand beyond its anti-piracy origins into aone-stop 
shop for multidisciplinary censorship through the DNS.  
No matter how vehemently ICANN officials insist that they 
are respecting their mission’s limits, ICANN knowingly created a 
contractual architecture for the new gTLDs that supports an 
unprecedented program of private, DNS-based content regulation 
on behalf of copyright holders and, potentially, other “trusted” 
                                                                                                     
 163. See supra Parts IV.B–C (discussing ICANN’s approval of the trusted 
notifier program as a means of regulating content). 
 164. Cf. REBECCA MACKINNON ET AL., CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, 
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR A FREE AND OPEN INTERNET 1 (2016), 
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/GCIG%20no.45.pdf  
(asserting that, to the detriment of human rights, “governments, companies and 
a range of other non-state actors are pursuing short- and  medium-term  interests 
and agendas regarding how the Internet should be used and governed with 
whatever legal, regulatory, financial, political and technical tools happen to be 
available”). 
 165. See generally Annemarie Bridy, Copyright’s Digital Deputies: 
DMCA-Plus Enforcement by Internet Intermediaries, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW 185 (John Rothchild ed., 2016) (providing an 
overview of the various voluntary enforcement agreements). 
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parties.166 Moreover, in creating that architecture, ICANN did 
nothing to secure any procedural protections or uniform 
substantive standards for domain name registrants who find 
themselves subject to this new form of DNS regulation.167 That 
omission should be a red flag for those who worry that ICANN’s 
newly minted independence from the U.S. government will make 
its internal governance more susceptible to capture by powerful 
commercial and governmental interests.168  
For now, non-judicial notice and takedown practices in the 
DNS are limited; however, demands on intermediaries for stronger 
online content regulation across the board are growing.169 It is easy 
                                                                                                     
 166. For example, representatives of the pharmaceutical industry want DNS 
intermediaries to suspend domain names associated with illegal online 
pharmacies. Like the MPAA and the RIAA, they have demanded that ICANN use 
its contractual compliance process to require notice and takedown for sites alleged 
to infringe their patent and trademark rights. See Letter from Carmen Catizone, 
Exec. Dir., Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy, to Allen Grogen, Chief Contractual 
Compliance Officer, ICANN 1 (July 30, 2015), 
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/catizone-to-grogan-30jul1 
5-en.pdf (“NABP requests that if a domain name is alleged to be used for the 
illegal or unlicensed sale of prescription drugs, at a minimum, an ‘appropriate 
response’ and ‘investigation’ by the registrar under Section 3.18 must include 
requesting that the registrant produce jurisdictional license or authorization.”).   
 167. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the trusted notifier program’s lack of 
procedural safeguards). 
 168. The debate over the IANA transition focused almost entirely on how to 
prevent ICANN from becoming captured by its most assertive stakeholders and 
how to ensure its accountability in the absence of DOC oversight. See, e.g., 
LENNARD G. KRUGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FUTURE OF INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES RELINQUISH ITS AUTHORITY OVER 
ICANN? 2 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44022.pdf (stating that “the U.S. 
government’s authority over the IANA functions has been viewed by the Internet 
community as a ‘backstop’ that serves to reassure Internet users that the U.S. 
government is prepared and positioned to constitute a check on ICANN under 
extreme circumstances,” including “capture or undue influence by a single 
stakeholder or by outside interests”). 
 169. Recent targets include terrorism and hate speech. See, e.g., Olivia Solon, 
Facebook, Twitter, Google and Microsoft Team Up to Tackle Extremist Content, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/ 
05/facebook-twitter-google-microsoft-terrorist-extremist-content (last visited Oct. 
12, 2017) (discussing a plan to create a shared database of ‘unique digital 
fingerprints’ that can identify images and videos promoting terrorism) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Mark Scott, Europe Presses 
American Tech Companies to Tackle Hate Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/technology/europe-hate-speech-facebook-
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to imagine programs like the MPAA’s expanding soon to serve a 
much broader universe of notifiers—including private and 
governmental actors targeting what they perceive as fake news, 
hate speech, and terrorist propaganda. Lack of transparency and 
due process in such programs will make them inherently 
vulnerable to inconsistency, mistake, and abuse and could 
transform the DNS into a potent tool for suppressing disfavored 
speech. 
                                                                                                     
google-twitter.html?_r=0 (last visited Oct. 12, 2017) (“Amid growing security 
tensions in . . . the Western World, governments, intelligence agencies, and 
advocacy groups want Google, Microsoft and other technology companies to take 
further steps to curb hate speech on digital platforms, as well as to clamp down 
on how terrorists circulate information online.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). Right holders are also demanding notice and takedown in the 
DNS for legacy gTLDs in addition to new gTLDs. See Letter from Steven M. 
Marks, Gen. Counsel, RIAA, to Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Bd., ICANN, and 
Fadi Chehade, CEO, ICANN 1–2 (May 12, 2015), 
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/marks-to-crocker-chehade-
12may15-en.pdf  
[W]e believe there should be strong protections against online 
copyright infringement in all TLDs, whether legacy gTLDs or new 
gTLDs, and that any gTLDs that particularly target music or digital 
content should have increased commitments to guard against such 
infringement. . . . We expect ICANN to ensure this happens in a 
responsible and effective manner. 
